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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
ESCALATION PROVISIONS FOR NAVY CONTRACTS:
ISSUES AND CHOICES
BY
Michael G. Sovereign and Carl R. Jones
Associate Professors, Naval Postgraduate School
Payment of escalation for Navy contracts raises four major issues:
- Why is input price change a particular problem for Navy contracts?
- Why is escalation a good procedure for dealing with price changes?
- What are the possible side effects of escalation?
- Can escalation provisions be made which reach a proper trade-off
between administrative cost, accuracy and the contractor's incen-
tive to minimize cost?
The complete solution of these issues must be in the context of parti-
cular acquisitions. For each of these acquisitions, a series of choices
must be made:
- What prices should be covered?
- How should price changes be measured?
- When should the measurements be made?
- How should the measured changes be compensated?
The presentation of issues and choices is an important first step in
addressing escalation and will be followed by additional investigation.
Quantitative models of the effect of escalation have been formulated
but are not addressed in this paper. Also, the question of whether
escalation promotes general economic stability or instability remains
moot. Finally, there are interfaces between the question of escala-
tion for contracting and the budgetary process and with general DOD-
industry profit policy which also remain to be investigated.
ISSUE 1: WHY ARE PRICE CHANGES A PARTICULAR PROBLEM IN NAVY
CONTRACTS?
This issue is implicitly addressed in the paper. Standard commercial
practice is that sellers include anticipated input price changes in their
selling price. Why should special procedures be necessary in the Navy?
The answer is in the nature of the development and production of weapons.
The U.S. technological advantage in weapons systems has been accom-
panied by a departure from the ancient market practice of letting the
producer design, test and produce the item which is then purchased by
the buyer. Because of the limited number of customers, the producer's
imperfect knowledge of the customer's need and the high investment in
developmental and working capital which would be required, the military
has instead contractually promised cooperation in the design and test
process and promised to pay for the resulting systems long before the
weapons exist. There may be alternative solutions but in this paper
we are forced to consider the long periods of uncertainty under Navy
weapons systems contracts, for example 8 years for the CVAN-68
.
ISSUE 2: WHY ESCALATION FOR PRICE CHANGES?
Escalation is the explicit contractual treatment of price change
in which the contract price is adjusted after price changes are measured.
Thus input price uncertainty is removed or reduced. Because decision
makers avoid uncertainty, the escalation approach is attractive to both
parties to the contract, as demonstrated in Chapter I. The major alter-
native to escalation is contingency pricing where the contract price
includes anticipated inflation. In times of changing rates of infla-
tion or deflation this anticipation is quite difficult. Since major
weapon system contracts are large, long and infrequently awarded, the
penalties of even one incorrect prediction can be substantial compared
to the net worth of the contractor. Contingency pricing is not an
attractive alternative under these conditions. Other alternatives to
escalation addressed in Chapter I have serious shortcomings for Navy
weapons systems contract.
ISSUE 3: WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE SIDE EFFECTS OF ESCALATION?
Although escalation appears to be an attractive device for dealing
with price changes during a contract, there are potential problems
when addressed from a wider viewpoint.
One question is how to budget for price changes. Because escalation
is an explicit acknowledgement of a price change, inflation will cause
a "cost overrun" if an overrun is defined as any increase over the
contract's target price. Contingency pricing provides a cushion of
predicted price change which may even allow cost-overruns from other
causes to be disguised if input price changes are less than predicted.
Thus the apparent budgetary outcome can be significantly affected by
the choice of handling price changes in the contract. This problem
could be solved in the shipbuilding appropriations category by separately
funding an aggregate of escalation, which would not be the fault of the
individual ship projects. Recent Congressional reporting procedures for
each project may make this treatment less viable. Study of this issue
continues and will be addressed in a later paper.
The other potential side effect is the possibility that wide-spread
escalation may encourage general price inflation. Arguments can be
given either way on this issue and it is unlikely that anything short
of experimentation would answer the question. With DOD expenditures
at 6% of GNP it is doubtful that Navy actions alone can substantially
endanger the economy however
.
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ISSUE 4: CAN A SATISFACTORY TRADEOFF OF ADMINISTRATIVE COST,
ACCURACY AND CONTRACTOR INCENTIVE BE REACHED?
Even though escalation clauses are conceptually beneficial, the
practical implementation will require that the cost of administering
escalation provisions must not exceed the benefit. Customary escala-
tion procedures are quite simple but are moving in the direction of
complexity. This complexity is a response to the fact that recent
inflation has made the monetary value of escalation payments rise.
The inaccuracies or discrepancies between escalation paid and that in-
curred by the contractor, which were negligible in periods of lower
inflation, are now substantial. As discussed in Chapter III, the
difficulty with accurate measurement of the contractor's price changes
is that they are more likely to reflect variables that he can control,
i.e., his actual labor or material or overhead cost. This potential
control raises the incentive or moral hazard issue, that he will be
more inclined to allow his input prices to rise if he is reimbursed
by escalation payments. The use of indirect measurement through price
indices is the major tool to control this behavior, known as moral
hazard in insurance, but indices are inherently inaccurate for any
particular contractor. The choices in implementing an escalation
provision described below are those which will determine how the
trade-off is actually accomplished and whether it will be successful.
CHOICE 1: WHAT PRICES SHOULD BE MEASURED?
Several choices are necessary in this area. For most any weapons
system an input price index for the contractor should be used rather
than an output price index because of the difficulty of identifying
equivalent output units over time for ships and aircraft.
Inputs should be measured on the level of aggregate direct material
and labor. Indirect labor and materials may be broken into individual
cost categories or simply treated as included in labor and material.
Escalation of depreciation is recommended as a minimal recognition of
the increasing opportunity cost of equipment and facilities.
The depreciation question raises the issue of DOD profit policy
which unfortunately is unclear at this time. Escalation of fee,
although discouraged by DPC 120 when explicitly addressed, is implicit
in contingency pricing since the costs, on which profit is based, are
usually increased to include inflation. Explicit nonescalation of
fee results in the contractor receiving a lower percentage fee than
was negotiated. In addition the fee is paid in dollars with decreased
real purchasing power.
An important choice is whether the initial estimate or the actual
mix of labor and material will be measured. The use of an estimated
mix is favored by the ease of administration and the removal of any
incentive for the contractor to change his mix merely to gain in
escalation. These benefits may be offset by the inaccuracy of the
estimate. Inaccurate prediction of the mix could result from changing
in
conditions after the negotiation of the contract or from the use of
an average mix when a competitive contract is being awarded. Analysis
of the extent of the inaccuracy in the ship building mix has been per-
formed by MAT 02 and found to be small in most cases in the recent
past [13]. The major inaccuracy that was found was due to schedule
slippage, which can be removed through relating the escalation to actual
progress rather than an estimated schedule. For this reason, when es-
timation of the schedule is questionable, actual progress should deter-
mine escalation. If actual progress is used the actual mix will be
automatically recorded. The actual mix and schedule is therefore
favored in any case where prediction of mix and/or schedule is difficult.
CHOICE 2: HOW SHOULD PRICE CHANGES BE MEASURED?
The major choice in measurement technique is that of price indices
versus measurement of the contractors actual costs. Price indices
are favored by ease of administration and the removal of moral hazard,
i.e., the possibility that the contractor will not resist increases
in input prices. Again the benefits of price indices may be offset
by their inaccuracy for a particular contractor. In such cases the
administration cost of the measurement of actual costs should be
examined and the degree to which other constraints will keep the moral
hazard under control should be evaluated. In some situations these
conditions will be favorable and actual costs may be measured for esca-
lation purposes.
CHOICE 3: WHEN SHOULD PRICE CHANGE MEASUREMENTS BE MADE?
The choice of a base date for escalation measurement should be
shortly prior to the beginning of the contract to allow contract cost
estimating to be based on current prices.
The choice of frequency of observation may be determined by the
availability of indices. Otherwise measurement frequency must again
be a compromise between added administrative cost and accuracy.
The timing of payment of measured escalation is complicated by
the progress payments situation which is currently unclear, at least
in shipbuilding. Payment of escalation should be integrated with
progress payments to reduce administrative costs. The final choice
is whether to cease measurement when some schedule milestone date
arrives. This procedure would retain any incentive for early completion
that the customary shipbuilding escalation clause is said to provide.
This incentive is created because escalation is based on an initial
estimate of progress rather than actual progress. Since escalation
payments were therefore unaffected by the contractor's actual progress,
he has an incentive to purchase his inputs early and thereby avoid
inflation. Presumably this leads to earlier completion. "Freezing"
the measurement of price change as of the deliver milestone date would
provide a somewhat similar incentive. It would also provide incentive
for the shipbuilder to negotiate a later delivery milestone. Further-
more, it would not provide incentive during periods of stable prices
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and could provide a schedule dis-incentive in periods of price decline.
It is therefore not recommended unless an accurate prediction of material
and labor price trends is available, which is contrary to the basic
suposition of this paper and recent experience.
CHOICE 4: HOW SHOULD THE MEASURED PRICE CHANGE BE COMPENSATED?
The choice involved in compensation is what portion of the measured
price change to reimburse the contractor. One choice would be to make
the contractor share in the risk of price changes, that is give him
less than the measured change. The other extreme is to increase the
measured change if the measurement is thought to be biased downward
compared to the particular contractor's experience. Forcing the con-
tractor to share the risk contradicts the reason for escalation. How-
ever if there were no other way to prevent moral hazard in a parti-
cular circumstance, sharing could serve as an incentive for the contrac-
tor to hold down input price increases. Multiplying the measurement
seems a grossly arbitrary means of adjusting for inadequate measurement.
It has been suggested that the contractor should share in escala-
tion when costs rise above the target cost. Because target cost may be
exceeded for a wide variety of reasons or may never be reached, this
approach would not serve for prevention of moral hazard. A different
technique, the share line, is designed to provide incentive to keep
cost below target and functions regardless of inflation rates. It is
hard to see what purpose sharing above target fulfills although most
current shipbuilding clauses do so.
Through modification of the measurement procedure such as freezing
it at the delivery date, the escalation clause can conceivably provide
additional incentives. In this case freezing might be an incentive to
complete the contract by the delivery date. However, the size of the
incentive is unknown because it will depend upon how much inflation
occurs. It would also provide a reason for contractors to negotiate
later delivery dates, which is already a difficult area. Somewhat
similarly, having the contractor "share" in escalation beyond target
cost would provide an additional cost incentive but again of unknown
amount
.
Sharing in escalation over the entire range of the contract could
be used as a protection against more hazard, but it would also mean
substantial assumption of the risk of price changes by the contractor.
However, in cost incentive contracts it is sometimes assumed that a
small percentage such as 10 - 20% of cost is enough to influence a
contractor.
All of the schemes which would reduce escalation below the amount
incurred by the contractor are contradictory to the purpose of the
escalation clause, the removal of uncertainty. They all raise the
likelihood of contingency pricing by the contractor. Experience with
other contract incentives has shown that those which cannot be pre-
dicted and which interact with other clauses often cause unexpected
problems.
As can be seen by the discussion a large number of choices have
to be made. Particular escalation clauses will require fairly detailed
consideration. One method for evaluating particular escalation pro-
visions is "gaming" or detailed simulation of what would happen to a
contract with a particular clause under a variety of circumstances such
as inflation, cost overrun etc. Such models have been developed and
exercised in support of negotiations. They are to be the subject of
later papers.
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ESCALATION PROVISIONS FOR NAVY CONTRACTS:
ISSUES AND CHOICES
I. WHY HAVE ESCALATION PROVISIONS?
A. ESCALATION: CONCEPT AND CAUSES
Recent high rates of inflation have focused attention
upon mechanisms for dealing with inflation in long-term Navy
contracts. Escalation clauses are the explicit contractual
provision for inflation or deflation. In this paper, escalation
is defined as the contractual amount paid to reimburse a con-
tractor for any measured changes in the price of his inputs
during the life of a specific contract. Escalation is referred
to as the "economic price adjustment" in DPC 120 [1] but this term-
inology is needlessly complex. Escalation can be either a
positive or negative adjustment. Escalation must be triggered
by some measurement of price changes. The measurement of price
changes may not discriminate between the possible causes of the
change:
1. a general change in price levels - inflation or
deflation, i.e., an "economic" change,
2. relative price changes due to supply and/or demand
changes,
3. increases in the contractor's input prices resulting
from relaxed bargaining with suppliers on the part of
the contractor because of the escalation.
The objective of including an escalation clause in a
contract is to adjust the contract in response to changes in
the general price level, the first cause mentioned above. But
inflation or deflation is not the only cause of price changes.
The market system operates so that a change in the price of a
good can also be the result of a shift in the demand and/or the
supply of the good, the second cause mentioned above. The price
of labor in an area may increase, for example, when a new brewery
opens in the Newport News area. Such price changes are an essen-
tial mechanism for allocating resources in the economy. Although
the previous example was perhaps disadvantageous to the Navy,
the use of similar price changes was to be a major mechanism
for attracting labor to the new Litton Pascagoula shipyard,
which would be to the Navy's advantage. Both of these rather
complex situations demonstrate that we must be very careful to
remember that not all price changes have the same cause. Escala-
tion might respond to any price change and so must be carefully
used or it could destroy the contractors incentive to adjust to
new technology, local supply conditions, etc.
The third cause is a possible effect of the escalation
provision itself. The payment of escalation could provide an
incentive that reduces the contractor's diligence in holding down
the prices of his inputs. This potential often can be avoided
by measuring the price changes on a broad scale rather than
those of a particular contractor. Usually this is done by
basing escalation on the movement of a recognized price index.
In addition, an escalation clause may indirectly affect
the behavior of more than just the contractor. It may impinge
upon his subcontractors, (with or without pass-down clauses)
his labor unions, his competitors in the industry and even the
government or Navy itself. For simplicity we will usually refer
to the contractor only, but the indirect effects can be very
important and should not be overlooked in any specific application
of escalation clauses. This wider viewpoint is also reflected
in some opinions that widespread use of escalation could contri-
bute to macro or total economic system price instability. On
the other hand some feel that escalation is useful in preventing
further price increases by reducing uncertainty. A recent issue
of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review addresses both
sides [2] . This paper will not deal extensively with this ques-
tion because it is a major unknown at this time. With regard
to the three causes, this paper will most heavily address inflation
The other causes must be kept in mind in order to formulate esca-
lation provisions which remove uncertainty of inflation without
providing dis-incentives for response to relative price changes
or to resist input price increases.
This paper identifies the choices which must be made
when an escalation clause is to be implemented. Later papers
will describe models for decision-making in those choice situa-
tions. First the objectives of the escalation clause are es-
tablished in this chapter.
B. CAN ESCALATION SERVE BOTH PARTIES?
The escalation provisions in a contract must serve the
objectives of both parties to the contract, the Navy and the
contractor. The escalation provision is concerned with payment
for the work to be done, an issue which is too central to any
contract to simply be imposed unilaterally by the government.
Asking any provision to serve the objectives of both parties
may seem difficult but it is to the advantage of both parties
to remove the uncertainty in prices from long-term contracts
through an escalation provision, as will be seen in this section
Before beginning the detailed arguments, a quick intui-
tive version will be given which is intended for those who do
not wish to pursue the detailed argument. The objectives of
both parties will be discussed below and in detail in sections
C and D. Contractors are aware that prices of their inputs
change during long contracts. In the face of uncertainty as
to how the prices will change, the contractor will usually
be conservative and attempt to "cover himself" by estimating
a larger price change than actually occurs on the average.
However, he still runs a risk if unusual price changes occur.
In fact this is probably the origin of the current interest in
escalation clauses. Even contractor's conservative estimates
have been exceeded by recent price changes. In such times the
contractor should prefer an escalation clause which assures him
of reimbursement of whatever price changes occur.
From the Navy's viewpoint, the advantage is the savings
between the contractor's higher than average estimate of inflation
and the "average" price change in the long run. In addition the
difficulties faced in abnormally inflationary times such as the recent
past, with contractors refusing new contracts and finding ways of
"getting well" or abrogating old contracts, would be avoided.
Implementation of these advantages to both parties may not be
easily reached however, as will be discussed in later chapters.
Moreover there are wider viewpoints possible than just those of the
parties to the contract, as will also be discussed.
C. THE CONTRACTOR'S OBJECTIVES
The contractor is assumed to be an expected utility maximizer
and to be risk averse. These two concepts, which are discussed below
are somewhat more complex than the usual assumption of "profit maxi-
mization" but are necessary if uncertainty is to be explicitly con-
sidered.
Suppose a sole source contractor and the government have
agreed that the best cost estimate at current prices of a weapon
system is C. They have also agreed that a fair and reasonable
profit is II . Now the contractor points out that if prices of
the inputs included in C do not rise, he can sign the contract
for a total price of C + II and expect to earn II . But suppose
there is uncertainty about input prices. Assume that with proba-
bility p, prices will not change but with probability p~ they
will increase to a level such that the contractor's profit
decreases by the inflation rate (r) times the cost (C)
.
That is, profit would decrease by rC . In order for the contrac-
tor to anticipate an average profit of II over many such contracts,
he would need to have some chance of making more than II , so as
to offset the possibility of increased prices decreasing profit.
He can calculate II , the profit required to give him II on
the average as follows:
or




= n + p2rc
The contractor therefore offers to sign the contract without esca-
lation provisions for C + II + p~rC . This contract price of costs
(C) plus a fair and equitable profit (II) plus the average impact
of price increases (p2rC) is based on the rationale that over
several such contracts he will earn II .
The paragraphs above demonstrate the average profit
approach to uncertainty. Would an escalation provision be more
acceptable than the procedure above to the contractor? The con-
cepts of utility and risk aversion are now required. The utility
of profit to the contractor is merely some scaling of the dollar
profit with an arbitrary zero and some decreasing increment for
each dollar, if he is risk averse. The utility of an amount of
profit II , is written U (H) and merely represents a transforma-
tion of the constant increment dollar scale into one that show
diminishing marginal utility of money. It is therefore true that
U(II ) > U(IT) > U(II -rC) . Under the previous arrangement, the con-
tractor receives II with probability p.. and IT -rC with proba-
bility p2 - His expected utility would be
u = pxu(nE ) + p2u(n E-rc)
.
Suppose an escalation provision is determined that gives
the contractor a profit of II even if prices do rise. He then
receives II with certainty. The utility of II with certainty is
U(II) . The two utilities just mentioned ,U (II) and U = p^Udl^) +
J. E
P2U(II -rC) , are equal only if the contractor is risk neutral. That
is if he maximizes average profit. But one assumption usually made
in introducing utility is that most individual decision makers are
risk averse. This means they would avoid taking an even bet. They
want some favor in the odds to make up for taking the chance of
a serious consequence. This risk averse behavior means that the
contractor will prefer the certainty provided by the escalation
provision, i.e.
,
u(m > p1u(n£ ) + p2u(nE-rc) .
The net result is that a risk averse contractor will prefer the
contract with escalation. He will prefer a contract for C + II
and an escalation clause compared to a contract written to give
him an average profit of II . Another useful way to look at the
contractor's choice is that an additional profit All would have
to be paid to make him indifferent between the escalation and profit
IT versus the average profit II with uncertainty. The equation
U(n) = Pl U(IIE+ATI) + p 2 (IIE+AII-rC)
8would define the risk premium All necessary to make the contractor
indifferent between the contract without the escalation provision.
D. THE NAVY'S OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the party to the contract paying the
costs, in this case the "government" are listed as follows:
1. to minimize the anticipated cost,
2. to preserve the sources for defense weapon systems,
namely the contractors, in order to maintain some competitive benefits,
derived from the current industrial structure.
3. to avoid cost overruns,
4. to maintain a stable domestic economy by holding infla-
tion to a low rate.
The Navy contract negotiator's objectives are assumed to be
to acquire the needed defense items at the lowest anticipated cost
consistent with a "fair and reasonable profit" to the contractor
per ASPR. This is because the contract negotiator is primarily
interested in the negotiation itself, i.e., the contract, rather than
the results of the contract which occur over many years. He is
judged by comparing the contract against the approved negotiation
position rather than the ultimate outcome. This behavior is at
least consistent with objectives one and two listed above. The wider
objectives will be discussed later in section G.
Where an escalation provision is included, the Navy's cost
will be C + II with probability p. and C + IT plus the escalation
or change in price with probability p 2 . The escalation is rC. The
average cost with escalation to the Navy is therefore:
Governments as contrasted with individuals, are generally self-insured.




(c + n) + p 2 (c + n + re)
= c + n + p2rC •
Thus the expected cost to the Navy is the determined costs plus a
fair and equitable profit plus the average impact of anticipated
inflation. In contrast, without the escalation provision, we earlier




which is equal to II plus the expected inflation P 2 rC
In addition if the contractor is risk averse, as noted on page 8,
he will require an increment in profit ATI
, the risk premium. Thus
for the risk averse contractor the cost to the government will be
c
1
= c + n + p re + An .
This is obviously greater than the cost with the escalation clause
by the amount of the risk premium, All . Thus it is established that
the Navy has a lower average cost with the escalation provision and
the contractor has higher expected utility, i.e., they are both
better off. This general principle of the advantage of escalation
clauses will provide guidance.
The discussion above which establishes the advantage of
escalation to both parties has certain shortcomings as overall
guidance for escalation. First it clearly is limited to a simple
abstraction of the contractor. He does not have other contracts
or alternative business. His method of financing, which may
affect his attitude toward uncertainty, is not addressed. The
industry, his competition, has not been introduced. Later papers
will provide more detailed models of contractor behavior. We
expect that the general result will hold true however.
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Second, the discussion above assumes fairly limited
objectives for the Navy. Broader objectives such as contributing
to price instability and budgetary interactions are more difficult
to deal with particularly in an analytical way. However, they
are discussed in section G to a limited extent.
E. ALTERNATIVES TO ESCALATION - ESCALATION VERSUS CONTINGENCY
PRICING
The scenario in sections C and D is quite simplified and
does not quite follow the steps in a typical negotiation. In a
negotiation such as a NAVAIR negotiation with an aerospace com-
pany, no escalation provision is normally included in the con-
tract. The cost C is determined and then an inflation factor
(%) is applied to obtain the total cost, C + % C . Then a profit
11* is determined on the basis of the inflated cost of C + % C .
it
Since the profit II is on a higher, inflated cost it will likely
be higher than II . In such cases a prediction of the price change
reduces the uncertainty before profit is calculated. This is called
contingency pricing. The government is committed to paying more
than C + II . In fact if the contractor is risk averse he will again
increase the cost by more than the anticipated inflation "to be on the
safe side." This phenomena is somewhat similar to the buffer stock
in inventory - a stock larger than the expected demand is maintained.
Contingency pricing does have certain advantages. It is
a fairly simple contracting approach since the contract merely
addresses "cost" with no mention of how the estimate was computed
vis a vis inflation and no necessity for administration. This
approach makes it very difficult to obtain any record of how well
11
contingency pricing actually functions however. Another advantage
is that contingency pricing is probably the most common approach to
uncertainty in the commercial world. Thus there is wide experience
with its use. Therefore, even if a policy was issued to replace
contingency pricing with escalation clauses it would not be easy
to stop current practice and insure that the replacement actually
occurred. The contractor may increase his estimated cost to com-
pensate for inflation and take the escalation clause also. Since
cost is the product of price and quantity, the contractor can disguise
price changes by mis-estimating quantities of labor hours or materials
Thus the necessity for accurate cost estimating capability by the
government if escalation is to be used in non-competitive procure-
ments. This leads to some of the other approaches to price uncer-
tainty as discussed in the following section.
F. OTHER ALTERNATIVES TO ESCALATION
The above approach to price uncertainty is to simply rely
on the contractor to correctly estimate price changes or to bear
the results of his mistake. In times of stable rates of inflation
this is the standard commercial practice and is probably quite
adequate. Recent problems indicate that it is currently not
entirely satisfactory.
Another alternative would be the creation of a private
market for insurance against price changes. This would probably
be acceptable to both the government and the contractor. However,
12
no such insurance is currently available. Presumably this is at
least partially due to the "moral hazard" problem in such an
insurance policy if a particular contractor's price increases were
to be covered. If a more widely-based measure of price changes
were used, the problem is that the governmental actions would be
such a very large influence on the prices that establishing a
statistical or actuarial average change in prices would be very
hazardous. The lack of a private market should serve as a warning
of this danger.
From the discussion in sections E and F it can be seen
that the existing alternatives to escalation are not very attractive
in the face of unstable rates of inflation or deflation. For this
reason it is worthwhile pursuing the detailed choices required to
implement escalation in contracts, in order to remove price uncer-
tainty.
G. WHY ARE SOME AFRAID OF ESCALATION?
Why is contingency pricing often used rather than escalation?
In section D the objectives of the government were listed and these
were noted to possibly be a larger set than those assumed for the
Navy contract negotiator in section D.
One objective not addressed was the desire to avoid cost
overruns. Overruns are usually defined as all increases beyond the
target cost of the contract, which would include escalation payments.
Therefore any inflation at all leads to an overrun if an escalation
clause is used. On the other hand if contingency pricing is used
13
to set the inflated target cost, C + % C , no "overrun" occurs
unless the assumed rate of inflation is exceeded. The reason for
the sudden interest in escalation in the aerospace industry is
that actual inflation is exceeding the estimate made in contracts
in the preceeding years. The overrun question raises the important
relationship between how inflation is handled in contract escalation
clauses and how inflation is to be handled in budgeting procedures
and accountability for inflation both within DOD and before Congress.
In the shipbuilding appropriation category, where escalation
has been customary, each line-item reflects a reserve for inflation,
while the Ship Cost Adjustment (SCA) line item reflects difference
in this component as well as others in all prior year SCN line item.
Thus the individual ship projects have not been held accountable
for inflation. This procedure has been complicated by the institution
of SAR reports to Congress. A later paper will specifically deal
with the relationship of escalation in contracting and in budgeting.
The other objective that is not considered at the level
of the Navy contract negotiator is the price stability of the
economy as a whole. The widespread use of escalation provisions
may contribute to instability. If there are sudden inflationary
impacts on the economy such as the recent fuel price change,
escalation provisions pass these price changes undiminished
throughout the economy and therefore continue the inflation.
This may be a more equitable procedure than to allow one sector
of the economy to absorb the price change, but it does not neces-
sarily contribute to short-run stability. Walter Heller, exchair-
man of the Council of Economic Advisors has recently come out against
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"indexing" because of this tendency [3].
The effect of widespread escalation clauses on the price
stability of the U.S. economy is simply unknown at this time.
It can be argued that escalation clauses are in fact relatively
stabilizing because they offer industry protection from input
price changes. This should reduce the urgency to raise his out-
put price in anticipation of inflation, a phenomena recently
observed in the U.S. It will probably require experimentation
with clauses in some industries in order to determine the actual
effect of escalation on inflation. It is therefore difficult
to reject escalation clauses because of their potential contri-
bution to economic instability at this time. We therefore will
not further address this issue in this paper.
H. IMPLEMENTATION OF ESCALATION IN NAVY CONTRACTS
The following chapters address the choices required in
implementing an escalation clause. In section D above it was
shown that in general both the Navy and the contractor could
benefit from removing the uncertainty in price changes from
long-term contracts by escalation. The discussion ignored any
costs associated with administering the escalation agreement
and assumes perfect measurement of the actual change in prices.
In addition it was stated that the actual price should be outside
the control of either party. The last condition may not be
entirely met since both the contractor and the government con-
ceivably exert considerable control over prices such as the cost
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of labor in a shipyard. For example, the government could order
additional ships from the same or nearby yard thereby increasing
the demand for labor. Or the contractor might grant the union
an extraordinary increase during wage negotiations. One must be
very careful to look at particular escalation provisions, examining
them to detect situations where it would benefit one or the other
of the parties to exert control on the prices, since this clearly
might change the benefit of the escalation provision.
Similarly, escalation provisions with costly or burden-
some administrative requirements might negate the benefit of
escalation. The cost of adequate measurement of the escalation
is crucial to whether the benefits exceed the costs. Consequently
we must examine the provisions in considerable detail and test any
particular provision for low administrative cost, accuracy and
freedom from control by either contracting party.
The essence of an escalation provision is an agreement
by both parties to wait a certain length of time, measure a
change in the price of specified commodities and services, and
finally for one party to pay the other party a sum of money to
compensate for the change. An escalation provision can thus
be reduced to the following essential characteristics:
1. prices to be covered,
2. measurement of the change in prices covered by a
contract,
3. timing of the measurement for escalation,
4. formula for compensation for measured escalation.
Each of these four characteristics will be discussed
in turn in the following chapters.
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II. WHAT PRICES SHOULD BE COVERED BY ESCALATION PROVISIONS?
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapter I established that removal of price uncertainty
was desireable for both parties if an escalation provision can
be implemented that removes uncertainty without offsetting admin-
istrative costs and without inducing the contractor to allow
prices to rise. This chapter addresses the first question which
simply is what prices should be covered by an escalation clause.
First the question of input versus output prices is addressed.
Then direct and indirect costs and fee are discussed. Finally
escalation of changes to the contract is considered. The general
approach is that prices of inputs that are subject to long periods
of uncertainty should be covered by escalation in most cases. This
includes even the profit or fee which represents the "price"
of capital, that is the price of the entrepreneurial and invest-
ment inputs.
B. INPUT VERSUS OUTPUT PRICES
First, choice must be made between input and output price
indices when formulating escalation provisions. It has sometimes
been suggested that a DOD weapons price index be formulated which
would contain the weighted prices of weapons systems purchased in
a given year, i.e., the output of industry supplying DOD. Although
such an index might be of some value it would not be suitable to
use in contracts for the purpose of removing price uncertainty,
as will be discussed below. Instead the prices of the various
inputs of contractors should be measured.
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Weapon systems, including their subsystems and indivi-
dual components, have experienced considerable technological
change in recent years. Each unit such as a fighter aircraft
or ship now includes many more hours of labor and pounds of
material than in earlier years. These design characteristics
are quite distinct from the problem of price changes resulting
from inflation and prevent in practice the use of changes in
unit prices of weapons systems for escalation purposes, since
technological design aspects are then "mixed in" with price
changes and escalation only deals with price changes.
As for output prices for escalation
f
there are Navy
contracts which contain satisfactory output price escalation
clauses. These occur in the basic commodities such as metals.
For these products technological change has not resulted in any
substantive change in output specifications so an output price
per ton of a particular metal can be measured over time and we
can be confident that we are measuring the same output item.
Moreover the commodities are sold widely under conditions which
may be termed roughly competitive. In contrast, weapons systems
are often procured under conditions where there is a single
buyer, the government, and a single seller, the company. This
is known as bilateral monopoly.
It is indeed unfortunate that these two conditions, a
standard output unit and competitively marketed products are not
true for weapons systems so that output prices could be measured
for use in escalation clauses, since output prices have certain
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inherent advantages for escalation. They would allow the
contractor to substitute one input for another as prices change
without regard to the escalation clause. This desireable
flexibility was noted in chapter I. They would also allow the
government to share in increases in the productivity of labor,
increased efficiency and better management changes in packaging
and delivery which may occur as prices of inputs vary. In other
words, there is a measurement problem concerning the inputs
somewhat similar to that of outputs which is noted above. With
input measurement the errors may benefit the contractor. How-
ever, this effect is judged to be small and predictable and in
fact may well already be factored into the contractor's cost
estimate.
C. INPUT PRICES TO BE COVERED IN THE ESCALATION PROVISION
Although this would appear to be a relatively important
question, there is not much dispute about the prices covered
by the escalation provision, with the possible exception of
coverage of the fee. Standard commercial accounting practice
has led to escalation provisions which address inputs at an
aggregate level of direct and indirect material and labor.
The prices will be discussed by these types of cost. Particular
attention is given to the question of the degree of contractor
control over the price of the input.
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1. Direct Material and Labor Costs - Estimated or
Actual Mix
The direct costs of material and labor are a major
share of the costs of weapons systems. The prices of many materials
such as basic metals, are outside the control of any one contractor
or even an entire industry since they are widely used throughout
the economy. By current usage subcontracts are also included
in the material cost. These subcontracts costs and labor costs
are potentially much more directly influenced by the contractor.
On the other hand, the labor force is often highly unionized
on a nation-wide basis and structured by skill and length of ser-
vice. This means that control of labor costs may also not be
effectively under the control of any one contractor. Even if
they are under his control, most contractors also have contracts
without escalation clauses. To that extent, they continue to
have an incentive to hold labor costs down.
Typically both direct material and labor are included in
the escalation provision. However there still is the necessary
choice of using actual cost or an estimated mix of these costs.
That is, should the fraction of total cost considered to be
material, be estimated once at the beginning of the contract or
should the mix be adjusted as the contract progresses? The
advantages of using an initial estimated mix of labor and material
are
:
a. Ease of administration - the mix is specified in
the escalation schedule and no additional information is required.
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b. Ease of evaluation of bidders - if several
bidders are responding to a Request For Proposal (RFP) a
standard mix allows easier comparison of the total cost of
each proposal with escalation. Then total escalation cost
to the government will not vary because of any relative change
in prices of material and labor.
c. Freedom from influence on the contractors ef fi-
*
cient choices between material and labor. Ideally, the con-
tractor should not be influenced by the escalation procedure
in his choice of extent of subcontracting as was discussed in
chapter I. An estimated mix for escalation is irrelevant to
his choice. But if escalation is based on the actual mix, and
if there is a difference between the change in price for a
particular input and the measurement of escalation for its cate-
gory, the contractor may be influenced in the choice of that
input simply in order to collect more escalation. Such behavior
leads to inefficient choices of inputs.
2 . Indirect Costs
In general indirect costs, which are a sizeable share
of most weapon systems cost, are to be escalated. Under previous
regulations it was up to the Navy contract negotiator to deter-
mine whether indirect costs should be included, depending upon
whether these changed in proportion to the direct costs. Industry
cost accounting usually applies indirect costs as a fixed
The authors thank Professor Michael Block of NPS, for first
pointing out this feature.
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percentage of direct cost. Such a practice would indicate that
indirect costs should be escalated.
It is quite easy to get confused on this point however,
because of the fact that cost is the product of price times
quantity. Most of the cost accounting procedures are based on
changes in quantity rather than price.
Actual indirect costs may be slower to increase than
direct costs because the quantities of indirect services change
slowly. But indirect prices usually increase when direct prices
increase since indirect prices are predominately the salaries of
engineers and supervisors as well as employee benefits. In general,
all salaries rise in proportion and many benefits are a fixed per-
centage of wages. Therefore escalation of indirect materials and
services seems appropriate.
In certain Newport News contracts, fringe benefits have
been separately escalated. As pointed out in the LMI study [4]
the variation year-to-year and contractor-to-contractor in fringe
benefits presents considerable measurement problems. If actual
contractor costs are measured the moral hazard problem arise.
That is, he may increase fringes more than without the escalation.
Another component of indirect cost, although usually
less in weapons systems contracts than in commercial contracts,
is depreciation. In shipbuilding contracts, in contrast from
aerospace, depreciation is often not escalated, presumably
because of the contractor's depreciation cost account doesn't
change noticeably when prices increase. This is because of the
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unfortunate failure of U.S. accounting practice to update asset
values of existing firms. The replacement cost of facilities
and equipment has risen steeply and so has the opportunity cost.
A beginning step to ease this problem would be to allow escalation
on depreciation. However, selection of an appropriate index is
difficult. The next section addresses additional aspects of
this problem.
3 . Escalation of Fee
There is a prohibition on inclusion of fee in the
escalation agreement in Defense Procurement Circular 120. This
might end any discussion of this item if ASPR contained a satis-
factorily implemented profit policy. However there is consid-
erable opinion that profit has been either inadequate inequitable
or both, [5,6,7], We cannot solve the entire profit policy
problem in this paper. We shall only indicate the need for a
policy which does consider the effect of price uncertainty on
profit.
This question revolves around the uncertainty of the
real (deflated) value of a fee which is negotiated as a percentage
of cost in base year dollars but is specified in the contract
and paid in dollars during execution of the contract. When
inflation occurs, these dollars represent 1) a smaller percentage
of the escalated cost of the contract and 2) will be worth less
in real dollars than the fee computed at the contract signing.
The effect of price uncertainty is particularly acute if
the contract is an incentive fee contract because the fee may
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be reduced through no fault of the contractor. It is also
a problem in cost-type contracts where escalation of material
and labor cost is not a problem, since full costs are reim-
bursed as incurred. We will first discuss together the fixed-
price and cost-type contracts, then incentive contracts in the
following paragraphs.
In a cost-type contract the percentage fee is determined
by negotiation in accordance with the formula of "weighted guide-
lines." The total fee is entered in the contract as a fixed
fee in dollars rather than a percentage. The actual payment
of the fee is usually made monthly as the negotiated percentage
of the cumulative costs incurred to date. If there is inflation,
the negotiated fee will be realized in dollars but not as a
percentage of escalated costs, unless the total costs are kept
within the original target by some approach such as changes in
the specifications.
In addition, the fee is paid over the life of the con-
tract and therefore is subject to general price increases which
result in the contractor receiving a "deflated" fee, i.e., it
is worth less in real terms.
There are several possible results of this problem,
1) The contractor anticipates the inflation and "contingency
prices" his costs (or bid in a fixed-price contract) to obtain
his desired real fee. 2) The contractor through ignorance of
inflation or through competitive pressure does not adequately
contingency price and receives a deflated fee. 3) The contractor
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turns down the weapon system contract because he cannot anti-
cipate an adequate profit. This later case is most likely when
there is alternative commercial contracting available.
The first result, contingency pricing, is just an exten-
sion of what happens if material and labor are not escalated.
The same disadvantages hold true. It is hard to see any advantage
to not escalating the fee if this is the alternative.
The second result is the common one currently as well
as in the recent past and probably accounts for much of the indus-
try complaints about low profit, claims, etc. This in itself
might not be so serious at least to the Navy, if the second result
didn't have a great tendency to lead to the third result.
If there is alternative businesses available to the contrac-
tor, he is unlikely to continue taking long-term Navy contracts
when earlier contracts have yielded an unsatisfactory profit.
The most blatant example is the refusal of Newport News to perform
under the options in the 1968 contract for additional DLGN^class
nuclear frigates. If these contracts are renegotiated the pro-
fits in dollars on the escalated costs will be much higher in
dollars. The NMARC study has recently suggested escalation of
option prices.
In the long run, inadequate profit will have even more
serious effects. Some contractors have sizeable investments in
special facilities and capabilities for naval contracts. If
returns are sufficient to attract these contractors to further
Navy business, it is likely that dis-investment will occur at
substantial long-run cost to the Navy, in time, dollars and
effective platforms.
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In the case of contracts with cost incentives, inflation
over a period of years can make the incentive provision inoperative.
Accurate estimation of the target cost is the key to any incentive
structure. If unexpected inflation raises actual costs, the con-
tractor will receive a negative incentive payment conceivably
wiping out any profit on the contract. An escalation provision
can be used to cancel the demotivating effect of inflation on the
ability of the contractor to meet the target and earn his incentive.
If only the fee is not escalated, the incentive structure will not
be distorted by an inaccurate target cost. However, the motiva-
tional effects of the deflated fee may be much smaller than anti-
cipated. Over an 8-year contract the fee may loose most of its
value at current rates of inflation. An incentive contract is
based on the principle that small changes in fee have motivational
effect on the contractor. If this is true, escalation of the
fee would seem important to preserve the incentive structure.
It would be quite easy to base escalation on the total
of cost plus fee in order to remove this problem. This would
protect the real value of the fee. This change has been opposed
at least partially on the basis that this would be a fee awarded
as a percentage of cost. Cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contracts
are disallowed by statute. But it should be noted that the contin-
gency approach already does this in fact. It would seem quite pos-
sible to interpret ASPR in a way to resolve the problem as discussed
below, or to amend statute to allow full escalation as a fee based
on cost plus percentage of price. This would mean only a small
dollar change in total cost since escalation of fee would be
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perhaps a few percent of the total cost even with high inflation,
since the fee itself is usually about 10%. However, this past
year for example, there might be a twelve percent change in fee,
which is quite considerable to the contractor.
It may be quite unnecessary to change ASPR but merely
to properly interpret it. Since profit policy is not well
developed in ASPR, as noted earlier, it may be argued that fee
or profit actually refers to "real" fee. After all, the contingency
pricing technique practiced by negotiators for many years does exactly
that because it uses inflated costs as the basis for determining the
fee. Contingency pricing is not explicitly addressed in ASPR, but
ASPR did evolve over a time period when contingency pricing was the
main method used to "cover" inflation.
4 . Changes
In many contracts for major weapon systems, the changes
to the contract consisting of engineering changes, increases in
spares or support, and technological changes in mission requirements
have increased the original cost by a significant fraction. In
general the escalation policy has been to consider these changes
as not subject to escalation. The escalation schedule has been
keept unchanged for administrative convenience. This could produce
significant under-compensation for input price changes. This
potential is offset by two factors:
a. Usually engineering changes are developed and
implemented during a short time interval. They occur after the
contract has begun as changes are found necessary. Often they
are for work to be performed almost immediately so inflation does
not have much time to affect the cost of the change.
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b. Often the changes are "fully forward priced,"
i.e., the estimated inflation is included in the negotiated
cost of the change. This of course raises the question of con-
tingency pricing again.
In certain contracts, such as the DLGN, escalation is
based on the "projected final cost" or "floating billing base"
which does include changes, at least conceptually. Projected
final cost is obtained by dividing cost incurred by percent
contract completed modified by the escalation multipliers.
Although this is based on the physical progress concept which
may be passing from the scene, a similar procedure could be
included in escalation agreements in contracts based on the
cost incurred for measuring progress.
D . SUMMARY
Escalation seems logically applicable to all the inputs
which make up the cost of the weapon system to the Navy, including
fee. Experience gives guidance on how to aggregate the prices.
Elimination of some elements of cost does now occur when escala-
tion provisions are made but not in contingency pricing. ASPR
lacks a uniform policy on profit, which makes escalation of the
entire price of a contract more essential.
28
III. HOW SHOULD PRICE CHANGES BE MEASURED?
Previously this study has stated that the price level
changes due to inflation and the use of long-term, fixed-
price contracts by the Navy introduces uncertainty in contracting
The uncertainty resulting from the changes in price levels leads
to contingency pricing by defense contractors. It has also been
stated that both parties to a contract would prefer the lower
uncertainty if a method to measure price changes was incorporated
in an escalation provision in the contract. Two major methods
to accomplish the measurement of price changes which occur during
the contract period are indexation and the determination of
actual input prices the contractor pays. Indexation avoids
problems of control of price changes by the contractor but with
the disadvantage of less accurate measurement of the contractors
cost.
A. INDEXATION
1. The Index Concept
The United States General Accounting Office has
defined a price index as a ratio of prices at one time or place
to those at a previous or subsequent time or place selected as
the base [8] . An index that relates to a single item is called
a simple price index whereas an aggregate price index relates
to a group of items. The two most widely known indices, the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the Wholesale Price Index (WPI)
are aggregate price indices. Aggregate price indices are based
on the price fluctuations of a large collection of items, often
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called a market basket, which are selected to reflect the price
change of the group from which they were selected.
Any aggregate index must choose a particular set of
quantities of each item to be included in the market basket.
These quantities then serve as the weighting by which the price
of each item is multiplied in determining the total value of
the market basket. The usual question is whether to use quanti-
ties representing those consumed in the base year of the index
or in the current year. Administratively, base year weightings
are simpler and are used in the WPI and CPI. The WPI or some
subset is often specified in escalation clauses for material.
It is quite possible then that the materials in the WPI will
be weighted differently than is the current custom in any one
industry or for any one contractor. Thus indices are never
perfectly matched with a contractor's costs. Forecasts of the
WPI and CPI indices are available however, so contractors often
make use of indices even in contingency pricing.
2 . Index Criteria
An acceptable index must relate closely with the
type of contractor's cost being measured but also should be
broad enough to eliminate the influence of a particular con-
tractor or his subcontractors. Indexation is the major tech-
nique used to remove the escalation payment from the control
of the contractor. If an industry is dominated by sales to
DOD it may even be important to have sufficient breadth to
avoid control by the one industry.
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Although broad, the index should not be significantly
changed by items not in the contractors market basket. For
example, in measuring the price change of steel that a ship-
builder experiences, an index limited to shipbuilder's
steel plates would not be desired because other steel products
are also used. It would be desirable to measure a category
more limited than all metal products because a shipbuilder
does not use all metal products. The selection of an index
is a delicate compromise between breadth to avoid contractor
control and specificity to be relevant to his costs.
3. Detailed Index Construction
The determination of the particular indices for
a particular weapon system depends upon the specific mix of
materials and labor and the level of the industry.
For material, the WPI components by industrial commodity
group can be chosen as appropriate. For labor, the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) , which also compiles the WPI, conducts
wage surveys by industry and region according to the Standard
Industrial Code (SIC) . In addition a geographical distinction
might be made by use of the CPI as an adjustment to the BLS
industry-wide measures for labor
t
as discussed in the appendix.
Indexation of material and labor has been generally
successful in shipbuilding and Hazlett [9] has recently determined
indices for overhead costs of the aerospace industry. Indirect
costs, subcontracts and energy costs are more difficult. In
general the approach has been to assume that these follow the
direct costs which are more easily measured.
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B. CONTRACTOR'S ACTUAL INPUT PRICES
The second method that could be used to accomplish
the measurement of price changes during a contract period is
the determination of the actual prices the contractor pays for
inputs. This method is less general than indexation and offers
two advantages:
1. Determination and compensation of actual price
changes removes price risk from the contractor.
2. Actual prices can be as accurately determined as
resources for measurement permit, reflecting each individual
contractor's particular environment.
The disadvantages incurred by using actual prices
could include:
1. Reduced incentive for a contractor to aggressively
bargain during both wage negotiations and material procurement.
2. Confusion resulting from definitions of which costs
are covered and the interpretation of the definitions by indi-
vidual parties to the contract.
3. The documentation could prove to be administratively
burdensome.
4. From the Navy's viewpoint comparison of contractor
bids in different environments might prove difficult. One selec-
tion procedure would be to base cost distinctions only on each
contractors current costs. However, it might be known that one
contractor's costs could be expected to rise more rapidly than
another's. Should he be penalized in the source selection pro-
cedure? If not, Congress will complain. If so, projected
escalation will have to be estimated for each contractor. These
estimates would be subject to distortion because of the competi-
tive negotiations.
These advantages and disadvantages enumerated above are





The above advantages over indexation obtained by
determining actual contractor costs are interrelated. A con-
tractor who is compensated according to the actual prices
he experienced, would incur no price risk. His actual input
prices can be accurately determined so that any price changes
would be measured and reimbursed.
If only current costs were considered in source selec-
tion, an individual contractor would not have to consider his
input price position in relation to other contractors as with
indexation, since his particular economic environment would be
measured by the actual prices he experiences. Relative changes
in the geographical and regional differences would also be re-
moved as a consideration in bidding by the contractor. The
effect of an individual contractor's relationship in time
to the cycle of labor negotiations would also be eliminated
when developing a bid for the government. These advantages,
most of which benefit the contractor, are not realized without
the addition of some disadvantages also. These are discussed
in the next section.
2 Disadvantages
The removal of price risk from the contractor
could have an effect upon his performance. A contractor who
realizes that all of his actual price changes will be compen-
sated could develop a tendency of less aggressive bargaining
during wage negotiations and material procurement, if the
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escalated contracts are the vast majority of his business.
The knowledge that increased prices are passed on to the
government without reducing his profit could be an intangible
factor during bargaining sessions.
In order to incorporate actual price determination into
government contracts, many technical definitions of unit prices
would have to be implemented. Prices vary between contractors
according to quality, quantity, and mix of materials. Inventories
contain similar items purchased at different prices. Various
accounting procedures also allocate costs to different activi-
ties. Particularly difficult would be prices in the subcon-
tracting and indirect cost areas. Perhaps it would be necessary
to again assume these change in proportion to direct prices.
If so, the advantage of precise measurement is lost.
The parties to a contract could easily interpret the
definitions and provisions differently and/or incorrectly.
Legal entaglements and lawsuits could be a result from the
inherent confusion. The delineation of exactly which prices
are to be included not only would create confusion but also
could give the contractor an impetus to change procurement and
accounting procedures to include costs which otherwise would
not be covered by the contract.
For a large defense contractor, such as Newport News,
the documentation of actual costs could prove to be overwhelming.
The detail to which costs are documented is the crucial factor.
Documentation procedures that require an administrative effort
which would cost more than the benefits realized should be
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rejected. For the actual costs method to function properly
a level of aggregation of cost documentation that is satis-
factory for both contracting parties must be developed.
A documentation procedure acceptable to both parties
could be most easily negotiated under non-competitive bidding.
In contrast, competitive bidding under actual cost provisions
would be more complex. For example, one contractor might
submit the low bid for unescalated costs but due to geograph-
ical, labor contracts, or other circumstances he would not
be the low bidder after actual price considerations determined
the actual escalated cost. The government would have to
develop methods to weigh these factors before implementing
actual price provisions into competitive contracts.
C. COMPOSITE OF INDEXATION WITH ACTUAL PRICES
An alternative to pure indexation or to pure actual
price determination is a method which incorporates some aspects
from both of the previous two methods. Such an alternative
may allow the advantages of the other two methods to be realized
without also experiencing the related disadvantages.
For example, an escalation provision that incorporates
actual prices but still maintains incentive for aggressive
bargaining could be constructed with the index as an upper
bound. The government could agree to pay the contractor his
actual prices as long as they were lower than the unescalated
price times an agreeable BLS index. If his actual costs were
higher than the target price times the BLS index, then he would
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only receive the latter. In this way, the contractor would
have incentive to pay increases no larger for labor and material
than the average firm's experiences.
This method would allow for easier comparison of bids in
competitive bidding. The target prices of each would be the
deciding factor since each contractor would receive actual
prices or a maximum of target price times the index agreed to
in the contract. The maximum would be the same for each con-
tractor.
The method combining both indexation and actual prices
allows consideration for an individual contractor's particular
situation. If his circumstances allow him to produce a weapon
system at cost increases less than the average and still maintain
an adequate profit margin, then he could perhaps capitalize
on the situation in bidding. The government would then also
benefit by obtaining a weapon system at lower cost.
D . SUMMARY
Measurement of price charges is essential to escalation.
A compromise between accuracy and the moral hazard of measuring
the contractors actual price changes can be reached through
indexation. Indexation provides a means of measuring general
price level changes without distorting the contractors response
to relative price changes. It also removes much of the possible
disincentive towards a relaxed attitude to price increases by
the contractor although perhaps not to the entire industry to
which the index applies.
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IV. WHEN SHOULD MEASUREMENTS OF PRICE CHANGE BE MADE?
A. INTRODUCTION
The question of the timing for the measurement of the
amount of change of the predetermined prices can be broken down
into questions of:
1. The time of the base period or base date,
2. The frequency of observation or measurement of the
price changes,
3. The time lag between measurement and payment of
the escalation,
4. Whether the measurement should be stopped at some
time before completion.
Each will be examined in the sections below.
B. TIME OF THE BASE PERIOD OR BASE DATE
Establishment of the base period for contract escalation
is not generally a difficult question. It should be a time before
the contract initiation in order to allow the contractor to base
his cost estimate on known costs. This typically requires a base
period several months prior to issuance of the RFP for competitive
contracts or prior to contract signing for sole source contracts.
DPC 120 gives virtually no guidance on this point.
The choice of an early base period for measurement of
escalation will cause a higher fraction of the total cost of the
weapon system to be classified as escalation as compared to basic
cost. Escalation, as noted in Chapter I, is a category of cost
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overrun which is often held to be outside the project managers
responsibility. The choice of early base period has been
utilized by some project managers to their advantage.
C. FREQUENCY OF OBSERVATION OF INFLATION
The question of frequency of observation of the measure-
ment is affect by three principal concerns or criteria:
1. The attempt to remove price uncertainty by closely
matching the cost incurred with the escalation paid.
2. Administrative effort. This criteria somewhat con-
flicts with the first since administrative effort increases with
frequency, which raises accuracy.
3. Another concern is that the contractor not be encouraged
to "game" the escalation provision or negotiation.
High frequency of measurement of escalation would allow
the tracking of the prices the contractor is paying throughout
the contract. This would allow escalation to offset any inflation,
if measured accurately. However, frequent measurements take more
administrative effort. At the other extreme if only one measure-
ment of escalation was taken, say at the end of the contract, it
would be necessary to estimate the relationship between the rate
of inflation during the period and the contractor's rate of ex-
penditure. For example, if a two-year contract had final labor
price change of twenty percent above the base period, it could
be crudely estimated that the contractor had incurred ten percent
inflation on the average and should be given escalation of ten
percent of the total cost of the contract. However, the contrac-
tor may have incurred the labor primarily during the second
year. If so, the escalation based on the average may not
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compensate him for the price increases he had to pay. DPC
12 states "Adjustments should be of such frequency so as to
afford the contractor appropriate economic relief without creating
burdensome administrative effort." The frequency of observation
could be varied to match the rate of expenditures. However, that
presents difficulties in the availability of indices on the right
date and in case of changes or slippage in the schedule.
Shipbuilding labor escalation is often paid quarterly,
although it is paid on an estimate of the quarterly labor rather
than actual labor. An estimated curve of percentage completion
versus time is agreed upon at the signing of the contract. Of
course, it is still necessary to make the assumption that infla-
tion and rate of cost incurred are matched within the quarterly
period. In fact the current shipbuilding escalation provision
assumes that the cost is incurred at the end of the period since
full coverage of the inflation up to the point of measurement
is provided. In periods of inflation a contractor is encouraged
to incur his expenses early by this arrangement, or by any
arrangement not based on his actual expenditures; he will
incur less price change, by purchasing earlier, while the escala-
tion he receives is unaffected by his early purchase.
One result of the current system is that it provides
an incentive for early completion of at least the major portion
of the work by the contractor, as mentioned above. This may be
a very valuable incentive because the current shipbuilding con-
tract does not effectively penalize the shipbuilder for delays
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in delivery. On the other hand, the shipbuilding delays are
often the fault of the Navy. The contractor wants to finish
and be paid. During periods when the industry is operating at
full capacity he is eager to clear the ship out of the yard
because it is tying up his capacity. During other periods it
may be to his advantage to keep work in the yard while waiting
for additional contracts. The current escalation provision pro-
vides some incentive for him to complete most of the work early.
A related point is addressed in section D.
D. TIME LIMITATION ON MEASUREMENT
As noted in section C, the current escalation clause
provides some incentive for the contractor to complete his work
on schedule; if not early. If the escalation clause is made
more flexible in the direction of reimbursement for the change
in price whenever the contractor incurs the cost, this incentive
will be lost. It has been suggested that some incentive could
be retained by freezing the measurement as of the scheduled com-
pletion of the contract. This might provide a small incentive
for completion of the majority of the work by the scheduled
delivery date but would also provide an incentive for the con-
tractor to negotiate later delivery dates. Other means of esta-
blishing delivery incentives are available which would not in-
validate the removal of price uncertainty from the contract as
this would. Freezing the measurement would be a small incentive
if there were low inflation and could be a very large penalty
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if inflation were severe. This variation in penalty is essen-
tially independent of the Navy's urgency for delivery. it
therefore seems an inappropriate answer to the problem.
E. TIME BETWEEN MEASUREMENT AND PAYMENT OF THE ESCALATION
Another question regarding timing of the escalation
measurements concerns the relationship between the measurement
and payment of escalation and the other payments to the contractor
DOD makes payment to contractors before delivery in order to
reduce their financing costs. These payments are generally
called progress payments. The measurement and payment of esca-
lation might be timed to coincide with progress payments in order,
to reduce administrative costs. The new DPC 94 progress payments
provision [10] effectively does this. However, since the new
provision has yet to be implemented in shipbuilding, a brief
discussion of the older system is in order.
Major DOD contracts provide for progress payments of
eighty (80%) of costs. Until recently this has been interpreted
as 80% of the cost of work completed, rather than of actual cash
outlays. In shipbuilding, an estimate of physical progress for
each of material and labor is submitted by the contractor.
Payment of up to 95% of the product of that completion percentage
and the original contract price less performance reserves is paid
to the contractor. Progress payments are permitted as frequently
as twice weekly. Escalation payments were made quarterly, based
upon the measurement as applied to the contract curve for labor
and for material, unless a floating billing base clause is in-
cluded. Therefore in periods of inflation the contractor (or
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others) carried up to a three month investment in any inflation,
assuming the contract and actual curves for labor and material
coincided. Investigation of the contractors actual investment
in work in progress has revealed that the contractor has little
or no financial investment because he can delay payment to his
various suppliers but receives progress payments as the work is
performed [11]. This has the advantage to both the contractor
and the government of avoiding costs of interest or other
capital costs. However, these costs are borne by someone and the
procedure has a certain public relations cost, witness the recent
furor over the three million dollars Gruraan earned on its advance
payment. Therefore the Navy has issued instructions changing
the progress payments to "dollar progress" as defined below [12].
Dollar Progress : A term that represents the contractor's
cost which shall include only those recorded costs which result
from payment made by cash, check, or other form of actual payment
for items or services purchased directly for the contract, to-
gether with costs incurred, but not necessarily paid, for materials
which have been issued from the contractor's stores inventory and
placed in the production process for use on the contract, for
direct labor, for direct travel, for other direct inhouse costs,
and for properly allocated and allowable indirect costs, all as
shown by records maintained by the contractor for purposes of ob-
taining payment under a shipbuilding contract.
The effect of the above change on the escalation provi-
sion is not yet clear since no shipbuilding contracts have included
the new provision and its actual inclusion is in doubt.
F . SUMMARY
The base period for measurement of escalation should
slightly precede to the beginning of the contract. Frequency
of measurement will be limited by availability of indices and
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he administrative costs. The fixed payment curve of current
shipbuilding escalation provides some incentive for shipbuilders
to complete their work, suggesting that if escalation is to be
based instead on cost incurred, some additional penalty should
be assessed in order to retain the incentive for completion.
The penalty resulting from freezing the measurement on the
scheduled completion date would vary greatly with the rate of
inflation, which cast doubt on this incentive technique. Finally,
progress payment complicate handling of escalation.
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V. HOW SHOULD THE CONTRACTOR BE COMPENSATED?
Once the actual price change has been measured it would
seem straight forward to decide how to compensate the contractor
for the price change - simply pay him an amount equal to the
observed change. However, certain questions do arise:
1. Should the contractor "share" in the risk and there-
fore should the escalation payment be less than the measurement?
2. If the cost in an incentive contract is above target
should the contractor share in the escalation in the cost above
target?
3. If the measurement is based on industry or "average"
price changes, should the contractor be given an adjustment in the
escalation payment?
These questions will be dealt with in turn.
The argument given in Chapter I would indicate that both
parties benefit to the extent that the contractor's uncertainty
concerning price is eliminated. It was pointed out that he will
"contingency price" at additional expected cost to the govern-
ment if he is forced to face the uncertainty. Therefore deli-
berate attempts to make the contractor bear part of the risk
are contradictory to the reason for the escalation clause. This
reasoning would argue against the "abnormal" escalation clause
which contains a provision for the contractor to carry "normal"
escalation which he then will merely add to his cost estimate
as a contingency.
The second question poses the same difficulty plus does
not seem to be a reliable penalty for exceding the cost target.
If the contractor misestimates the cost of the contract should
he be penalized more in times of high inflation? Recent ex-
perience would indicate exactly the opposite. The government
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has seriously been looking for ways to relieve such penalties
yet the Navy is considering writing new escalation clauses con-
taining provisions which would increase the penalty for mis-
estimation in today's circumstances. If no inflation occurs,
no additional penalty would be incurred by the contractor even
though he has a large cost overrun. Thus sharing in escalation
above target seems particularly inappropriate.
Finally there is the question of departure of one con-
tractor's cost from the measurement. Somewhat recently Newport
News was allowed a clause with escalation payments based on a
multiple of the industry BLS shipbuilding labor index but limited
by their own experience as reported to BLS. This is an interesting
approach which comes closer to the composite of actual cost method
of measurement with indexation. However, it would probably be
better to use actual cost as a measurement technique than to
multiply the measured price change by an arbitrary factor. The
nature of any adjustment should be quite obvious and strongly
backed by experience which cannot be modified by the contractor
or general economic conditions. For example the clause referred
to above was negated by a change in the employment turn-over rate
at the shipyard.
In conclusion it would appear that excursions away from
a direct compensation for measured price changes will be difficult
to accomplish without disturbing the benefits of an escalation
provision. It also appears that as an incentive to completion
of the contract within target cost, sharing in the price change
will penalize the contractor for exceeding target cost only to the




This paper has delineated the issues and choices involved
in contract escalation. These are summarized in the Executive Summary,
The reader should review the Executive Summary again at this point.
The major conclusions of this paper are threefold.
1. Escalation is a desireable choice over contingency pricing
when the change in price level is uncertain over the life of the con-
tract.
2. Care must be exercised to reach a proper tradeoff between
administrative cost accuracy and moral hazard in the construction of
the measurement of change is price level. However no evidence was
found that this trade off is not satisfactorily reached at this time.
3
.
Certain changes in the traditional Navy escalation pro-
vision and in the newly proposed provision would allow even more
reduction of uncertainty without major increases in administrative
cost or moral hazard.
a. Elimination of fixed material and labor progress
curves for determining escalation as is now proposed.
b. Allowing escalation of all costs including fee,
as is inherent in contingency pricing.
c. Refraining from the proposed "freezing" of escalation
at the delivery date.
d. Refraining from requiring the contractor to "share"
in escalation.
Several questions which we intend to address later in the
research program should now be crossing the reader's mind, having
grown from this consideration of the issues and choices.
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1. How can a particular set of escalation provisions be
evaluated for a particular contract under circumstances of interest
to the Navy? A model has been proposed and used in one ship procure-
ment and is now being generalized.
2. Can general, quantitative statements of the response of
the contractor to escalation provisions be made? The crude model
of this paper which indicates the superiority of escalation is being
rigorously developed and extended.
3. What is the relationship between escalation for contracts
and the budgetary process, the relationship to DOD profit policy,
the relationship to the progress payments policy etc., that have not
yet been explored.
These questions are subject to additional research.
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